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Abstract 
In this paper we study the relationship between leverage and risk in commercial banking 
market. We employ a panel data set that consists of the biggest US commercial banks 
and which extends from 2002 to 2010 thus covering both the years before the outbreak 
of the current financial crisis as well as those followed. We make clear distinctions 
among different leverage types like on- and off-balance sheet leverage as well as short- 
and long-term leverage, which have never been made in the relevant literature. Our 
findings provide evidence that excessive leverage, both explicit and hidden off-the-
balance sheet, rendered large banks vulnerable to financial shocks thus contributing to 
the fragility of the whole banking industry. In a similar vein, a direct link between short- 
and long-term leverage with risk is reported before the crisis, showing that leverage has 
been one of the key factors responsible for the serious liquidity shortages that were 
revealed after 2007 when the crisis erupted. We also demonstrate that banks which 
concentrate on traditional banking activities typically carry less risk exposure than those 
that are involved with modern financial instruments. Overall, our results provide a 
better understanding of the role of leverage in destabilizing the whole system whereas at 
the same time contribute to the current discussion on the resilience of the banking sector 
through the strengthening of the existing regulatory framework.  
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1. Introduction 
The strength of the financial system has been tested for more than three years now. The current 
crisis, whose origins can be traced in the sharp increase in delinquency on US sub-prime 
mortgage market in 2006 and the succeeding collapse in housing prices in August 2007, has 
revealed several inherent problems in the operation of the banking system. Rapidly expanded 
balance sheets, performance-based remuneration practices and inefficient regulation of financial 
institutions are among the factors that have played a significant role in making the system much 
more fragile. There is, however, one more factor that is strongly related to the malfunctioning of 
the banking sector prior to the crisis and which had also contributed greatly to the buildup of 
vulnerabilities and adverse market dynamics in the recent past. We refer to the excessive degree 
of leverage of financial institutions in the years preceding the crisis, a feature that had also led to 
the near-failure of the hedge fund Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) in the autumn of 
1998 that had been triggered by the Russian debt restructuring. Indeed, the severity of the 1998 
market turmoil showed that the accumulation of excessively high leverage coupled with short-
term funding is a combination capable of producing substantial instability to the system. Yet, the 
importance of leverage combined with both increased securitization and heavy reliance on short-
term funding was disregarded by market participants and, most importantly, by national and 
supranational regulatory and supervisory authorities in the years running up to the current crisis. 
     Leverage has been always viewed as one of the main underlying features of banks’ balance 
sheets. Traditionally, it arises directly through formal debt like, for instance, through bonds and 
credit lines. Nevertheless, it seems that, in the pre-crisis period, banks leveraged their positions 
to a much greater extent than they used to a couple of decades ago by taking advantage of 
financial innovation which allowed them to transfer a large part of their leverage off their 
balance sheets. Consistently, over the past ten years or so, banks responded to the increased 
demand for credit instruments with higher yield by developing financial engineering techniques 
and creating modern types of products. Although these developments may have come about as a 
result of the wider financial advances aimed at improving the efficiency of the system, they have 
also provided opportunities for increasing leverage and for shifting risks among market 
participants in highly complicated ways. Several of the new financial instruments were indeed 
opaque and masked the extent of leverage and interconnectedness of risk, which appeared to be 
spilled-over across a wide range of institutions and markets worldwide. It can be deduced from 
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the discussion so far that -before the crisis- a significant degree of leverage was assumed 
implicitly, in the sense that it was not recorded on the balance sheet. 
     Furthermore, banks became more and more dependent on short-term funding in the years 
preceding the current crisis and this widened their asset-liability mismatch and increased their 
funding liquidity risk. To be more specific, banks were capable of funding a growing share of 
long-term assets with short-term liabilities in wholesale markets through Special Investment 
Vehicles (SIVs) and conduits. Yet, they were exposed to both credit and liquidity risk by 
providing facilities to these vehicles. Along the same lines, banks also held structured credit 
products on their own balance sheets thus exposing themselves to embedded leverage. After the 
crisis erupted, banking institutions sought to deleverage their positions thus amplifying the 
already existing downward pressure on asset prices which, in turn, encouraged deleveraging even 
further. This procyclical deleveraging process was exacerbated by the large size of systemic 
institutions and the high degree of interconnectedness among them. Overall, the malfunctions of 
the banking industry were transmitted to the rest of the financial system and, later, to the real 
economy, resulting in a massive contraction of liquidity and credit availability. 
Although the role that leverage plays in the stability of the financial system has been 
discussed in a number of theoretical policy and academic studies, not enough empirical evidence 
has been gathered to provide definite answers to the relevance of the accumulation of leverage 
and the subsequent deleveraging process in the propagation and prolongation of the crisis. Most 
notably, little attention has been paid to the overall leveraging and deleveraging behavior of 
commercial banks before and after the outbreak of the current financial crisis. We thus make an 
attempt to fill part of this void by assessing the effect of leverage and reverse leverage on the 
soundness of the banking system. More concretely, we empirically investigate the overall 
leverage and deleverage behavior of US Too-Big-To-Fail (TBTF) commercial banks before and 
after 2007 when the crisis occurred.  
Our emphasis on commercial banks allows us not only to make a distinction between on-
balance sheet leverage and implicit leverage, but also to measure leverage types of different 
maturities, that is short- and long-term leverage. An additional reason for focusing our attention 
on commercial banking is because this sector is both heavily regulated and largely supervised. 
This is in sharp contrast to what holds for investment banks as well as near- and non-banks that 
do not rely on deposits and, thus, are not obliged to keep much money in the form of capital. As 
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a result, these institutions face no serious restrictions on the level of their leverage. Hence, an 
issue that we also deal with in the current paper is whether the existing capital requirements are 
adequate to prevent an undesirable increase in commercial banks’ level of leverage.  
Our findings reveal, among other things, that both on- and off-balance sheet leverage 
contribute to banks’ overall risk. By the same token, we find that short-term leverage is 
negatively linked to the soundness of the banking system. Additionally, banks that concentrate 
on the traditional activity of taking deposits from households and making loans to agents that 
require capital are reported to carry less risk exposure to the system than those that are involved 
with new financial instruments. Overall, our results provide a better understanding of one of the 
root causes of the current crisis and contribute to the discussion on the enforcement of the 
existing regulatory framework for banks. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds in the following way. In Section 2 we analyze how 
leverage and reverse leverage of commercial banks are linked to risk. Section 3 then provides a 
description of the data set and a justification of the variables used together with summary 
statistics. The regression model and the estimation methodology followed are also presented in 
this section. Section 4 discusses the empirical findings, whereas their corresponding policy 
implications along with the concluding remarks are presented in Section 5. 
 
 
2.  Leverage, deleverage and risk 
Bank leverage, based on the traditional balance sheet concept, refers to the use of debt in 
financing new assets. More specifically, debt is used to supplement bank equity capital in 
financing fresh loans and investments that are expected to produce a higher rate of return 
compared to the interest rate that the bank has agreed to pay to its lenders (say depositors). In 
case the investment (or loan) return rate turns out to be lower than anticipated, bank’s equity will 
be shrink as the bank is forced to cover the difference between deposit and lending rates by using 
part of its equity. But what happens when a bank loan fails? In such a case, the bank that granted 
the loan is not able to recover the loan, which implies that the loan will be charged off. In simple 
terms, this means that the bank loses an amount of assets equal to the loan loss. The charge-off 
also affects the liabilities side of bank’s balance sheet as it reduces equity capital by the amount 
of the loss. If several borrowers default on their obligations, then the bank’s equity will be in 
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peril. Should nonperforming and defaulted loans accumulate -which is a common phenomenon 
in bad economic times-, the equity capital would disappear. Accordingly, equity absorbs the 
losses a bank suffers in case loans -or other investments- go sour. In sum, traditional bank 
leverage maps the riskiness of a bank’s asset position into the riskiness of its on-balance sheet 
equity stake.   
Bank leverage can also be traced off the balance sheet. Indeed, commercial banks are allowed 
to transfer some part of their leverage off their balance sheets through securitization and other 
modern financial activities.
1
 In the years running up to the current financial crisis, securitization 
occurred mainly through the set up of Asset Backed Commercial Paper (ABCP) conduits and 
Structured Investment Vehicles (SIVs) where banks were transferring their assets together with 
their risk.
2
 As a result, conduits and SIVs contained a significant degree of leverage, known as 
embedded leverage. This particular type of leverage was thus achieved through the structuring of 
the financial instruments per se. The risk -though transferred to conduits- still burdened the 
sponsoring commercial banks that provided liquidity and credit enhancements to conduits in 
order to ensure funding liquidity for the vehicles. These enhancements or ‘backstops’ attracted a 
low charge under Basel I and were funded mostly by rolling over commercial paper and only by 
very little equity capital. Hence banks were able to free up capital to originate more assets, 
generally of lower quality, and hide them in the shadow banking system.
3
 By doing so, 
commercial banks deliberately avoided issuing new (costly) equity capital to originate new assets 
and finance their activities in general. Nonetheless, under the aforementioned scheme of credit 
and liquidity backstops, investors in conduits and SIVs would return the assets back to the bank 
once they suffered a loss. As a consequence, commercial banks were obliged to take ‘bad’ assets 
back on their books in the light of the crisis.  
                                                          
1
 Banks have a strong incentive to structure products as they can qualify for lower capital requirements. An 
additional advantage of securitization is that it generates fee income. Fees do not have to be returned in case 
securities later suffer great losses, which implies that commercial banks have an additional incentive to engage in 
securitized activities thus leveraging even more their positions.  
2
 This action has become known as regulatory arbitrage. This type of arbitrage refers to the response of commercial 
banks to regulatory restrictions -especially those on capital requirements- that have been imposed by Basel I and II. 
Put differently, it is the game that takes place between banks and regulatory authorities whereby the former innovate 
and develop structured instruments in order to elude the scrutiny of supervisors and increase their returns, where the 
latter tighten the rules to avoid excessive risk-taking with the purpose to safeguard the stability of the financial 
system. For a thorough discussion of regulatory capital arbitrage via derivative instruments, see Beuer (2002). 
3
 Shadow banking consists of non-bank financial institutions like hedge funds, insurance funds, investment funds, 
pension funds, SIVs, conduits, to name the most important ones.  
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It should be apparent thus far that leverage (either on- or off-balance sheet) can be potentially 
harmful for financial stability. In case of over-leverage, a rapid and simultaneous unwinding of 
leveraged positions of financial institutions triggered by an adverse event -like the adverse price 
movements in the sub-prime sector of the securitized US mortgage market- can seriously 
threaten the soundness of the system. Moreover, in an economy-wide financial turmoil, highly 
leveraged firms are more likely to fall into financial distress, thus worsening their performance. 
Consistent with the corporate finance literature, distress deepens the interest conflicts between 
bondholders and shareholders and eventually increases the agency costs of debt (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). In a similar vein, the role of leverage as a disciplinary device that reduces free 
cash flow problems (Jensen, 1986) as well as its signaling power of conveying positive messages 
to the market (Titman and Trueman, 1986) both become less important when the firm is 
financially distressed.  
Equally -if not more- harmful than leverage per se is the so-called reverse leverage that refers 
to the phenomenon in which financial intermediaries all together attempt to shrink their balance 
sheets by reducing their debt. Deleveraging puts additional downward pressure on financial 
markets, especially in a system that consists of highly leveraged institutions. Any serious fall in 
asset prices or any large losses in loans or securities or any cut in cash flows can exert reverse 
leverage effects on the system. In the current crisis, the trigger for the deleveraging process was 
the deceleration of housing prices that was accompanied by an increase in mortgage default 
rates. The value of mortgage-backed securities was thus dampened, making financial institutions 
and other investors less willing to hold these securities in their portfolios. The downward spiral 
was further amplified by the downgrades of the majority of securitized products by the ratings 
agencies. Since a small downgrade can cause a big fall in the price of the downgraded asset, 
banks had to take immediate steps to strengthen their capital base in order to provide support to 
their assets. As a result, credit supply was sharply fallen and this, in turn, negatively affected the 
whole economic activity.  
To continue, short-term (wholesale) debt via the rolling out of conduits and SIVs is relatively 
cheap for commercial banks compared to long-term debt. Indeed, the costs of banks of holding 
much illiquid capital is largely removed with short-term debt. Nevertheless, short-term 
borrowing can cause serious liquidity problems, especially in case of financial distress: the 
funding of long-term investments through short-term securitized debt widens maturity and 
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liquidity gaps, making banks much more vulnerable to runs. Moreover, when the asset growth at 
banks is funded with short-term debt, the funding risk is increased due to the higher volatility of 
these funding sources compared to more stable retail deposits. Surprisingly, the crisis literature 
does not relate leverage to other aspects of the crisis, notably, liquidity tides and shortages.
4
 
These relationships are also addressed in this paper, using proxy measures for bank short- and 
long-term leverage.   
 
 
3. Empirical analysis 
3.1. Data  
Our empirical analysis is based on a data set that consists of the 12 largest US commercial banks 
as reported by the Federal Reserve Board (the bank names can be found in Appendix I).
5
 The 
institutions that are examined are representative of US commercial banking as they possess about 
50% of the sector’s total assets whereas their relative importance is increasing throughout the 
data period.
6
 This is to say, our sample banks are regarded as being TBTF in the sense that US 
government would be rather reluctant to let any of these banks to go bankrupt as this would have 
shattering effects on the whole financial system.
7
 Indeed, the 12 largest commercial banks that 
comprise our data sample provide the bulk of financing to industry and households in US, 
meaning that, if any of these banks were allowed to fail, this would inevitably cause, inter alia, 
serious systemic liquidity shortages in the economy. This is to say that we focus on some of the 
most systemically important financial institutions worldwide, which is a fundamental 
characteristic of our study. 
     Moreover, large commercial banks have been engaged in off-balance sheet activities to a 
much greater extent than their smaller counterparts. Indeed, the literature (see, e.g., Rime and 
                                                          
4
 Berger and Bouwman (2009) stress the lack of tangible liquidity measures as the main reason why liquidity is 
overlooked in the existing literature.  
5
 The US Federal Reserve Board compiles quarterly data on domestically chartered large commercial banks from 
2001 onwards.  
6
 Other recent studies that also belong to the burgeoning crisis literature and focus exclusively on systemically 
important financial institutions are those of Adrian and Shin (2010), who examine the procyclicality in leverage of 
the 5 largest US investment banks before the crisis and Huang et al. (2009), who construct a framework for 
measuring and stress testing the systemic risk of 12 US major commercial and investment banks.    
7
 To provide support to this argument, we mention that not a single US commercial bank amongst those failed from 
the beginning of the current financial crisis (which amount to 294 as of the end of September 2010 according to the 
relevant FDIC list) is ranked among the first one hundred large commercial banks.  
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Stiroh, 2003) has showed that big banks are very prone to universal banking activities in contrast 
to small and mid-sized banks which are less diversified and resemble single-line businesses. 
Hence, the distinction between on- and off-balance sheet leverage, which is in the focus of the 
present study, is expected to be made easier by using a sample that consists exclusively of big 
banks like ours. 
We think it is important to justify at this point why we focus our research on the US and not 
on some other banking system. The first reason is that the ongoing crisis originated in the US 
before spilled over to other Western-type economies. Hence, by investigating the US banking 
sector, we can trace some of the root causes of the crisis. Second, Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP) allow US commercial banks to treat their SIVs and ABCP 
conduits as being entirely off their balance sheets. In contrast, the International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) that European institutions follow is somewhat less tolerant toward 
off-balance sheet business as they require from banks to keep record of their SIVs and ABCP 
conduits on their balance sheets. Apparently, GAAP provide US banks with an additional 
incentive to undertake a higher degree of implicit leverage, which is in the center of our analysis.  
The data we employ are of quarterly frequency and cover the period 2002q1-2010q2. The 
whole data period is divided into two sub-periods: the earlier one (2002q1-2007q2) includes the 
years before the outbreak of the crisis, which were characterized by stable financial conditions 
and strong economic expansion. The second period (2007q3-2010q2) refers to the crisis period in 
which financial turbulence and recession prevailed in the economy. We chose not to examine the 
years before 2002 for two main reasons. First, the two big financial crises in Asia and Russia at 
the end of the 90s and -most importantly- the Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) crisis of 
1998 exerted a destabilizing effect on the US financial system also affecting the banking 
industry. Second, no considerable regulatory or other similar reforms have taken place in the US 
banking environment throughout the examined period, which means that the operation of banks 
has remained largely unaffected.
8
 If this had not been the case, the results concerning banks’ 
leverage behavior might have been biased due to changes in the regulatory structure.
9
 
                                                          
8
 In fact, the latest legislative activity in the US that largely influenced the operation of the banking sector as a whole 
was the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, which opened up the US financial market allowing commercial and 
investment banks, securities firms and insurance companies to merge their activities. 
9
 It is well established in the banking literature that regulation strongly affects industry structure and alters the 
behavior of banks in terms of performance and risk-taking (see, e.g., Brissimis et al, 2008). 
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Regarding our data sources, all bank-specific accounting variables are taken from the FDIC 
Reports on Condition and Income (Call Reports). To construct the proxy measure for embedded 
leverage we collect data from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)’s Quarterly 
Reports on Bank Derivatives Activities. The market interest rates used in the construction of 
total bank risk are from Thomson Reuters Datastream, whereas the short-term interest rates 
which are needed for the construction of interest rate risk measure are found on Federal Reserve 
Board website. Finally, macroeconomic variables are obtained from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis of the US Department of Labor.   
 
3.2. Variables definition 
We now turn to describe the variables employed in the econometric analysis.
10
 The dependent 
variable of the model is total bank risk-taking (TOTRISK). It is calculated as the quarterly 
standard deviation of each sample bank’s daily stock market returns.11 This metric of risk 
captures the total volatility of stock market prices for each individual bank incorporating credit 
risk, interest rate risk, and liquidity risk. 
To calculate TOTRISK, we first obtain the weekly returns for each individual bank using its 
stock market prices: 
 
1ln lniw iwiwR P P     
 
where iwR denotes the weekly (w=1, 2, …, W) stock market returns of bank i (i=1,2,…, N), and 
ln iwP  stands for the natural logarithm of the weakly average of bank i’s stock market daily price 
P. Total bank risk is then given by the following formula: 
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10
 All variables are summarized in Appendix II, whereas Appendix III reports summary statistics. 
11
 Similar risk measures have been used in the study of Galloway et al. (1997) and more recently in that of Gonzalez 
(2005).  
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where iq is the quarterly (q=2002q1, 2002q2,…, 2010q2) standard deviation of bank i‘s daily 
returns and iqR is the quarterly average of bank i’s weekly returns.  
     Turning to the right-hand-side variables of the empirical model, we utilize three different 
ways to measure on-balance sheet leverage. These are: the so-called gross balance sheet leverage 
ratio that is calculated as the ratio of total assets to the book value of total equity capital (LEV1), 
the inverted Tier 1 leverage ratio (LEV2) and, finally, the ratio of total liabilities to book equity 
capital (LEV3). Moreover, two proxies for implicit leverage are employed in our analysis: 
embedded leverage (EMBEDLEV) and off-balance sheet leverage (OBSLEV). To measure the 
former one, we follow Beuer (2002) and use the on-balance sheet asset equivalent component of 
the exposure implied by off-balance sheet items. This is calculated as the ratio of total notional 
values of all derivatives outstanding to total regulatory capital comprised by Tier 1 and Tier 2 
capital. The numerator stands for the own funds (i.e., equity capital) and borrowed funds (i.e., 
debt) equivalent bank derivative positions in a replicating portfolio of assets. Put simply, off-
balance sheet derivative positions are mapped onto their on-balance sheet equivalents. As an 
alternative to EMBEDLEV we use OBSLEV, which is calculated as the nominal value of off-
balance sheet liabilities scaled by total equity. To capture leverage of different maturity we use 
short-term leverage (SHORTLEV) that is measured as the ratio of borrowing with a maturity less 
than one year to total equity as well as long-term leverage (LONGLEV) calculated as the sum of 
other borrowings larger than one year with manadatory convertible securities and subordinated 
notes and debentures divided by total equity. 
     The combination of the recent financial stability literature (see, e.g., Berger et al., 2009; Uhde 
and Heimeshoff, 2009) and the bank risk literature (see, e.g., Gonzalez, 2005) provides us with 
the basis for the selection of the bank-specific and macroeconomic control variables that are 
expected to have an effect on risk. Consistently, it is well-established in the latter literature that 
risky portfolios increase total bank risk exposure thus undermining the stability of the financial 
system. We thus employ banks’ provisions for loan and lease losses divided by total loans 
(CREDRISK1) to control for credit risk and loan-portfolio quality. We also use the ratio of non-
accrual loans and lease finance receivables to total loans (CREDRISK2) as an alternative 
measure of credit risk. The quarterly standard deviation of the day-to-day 3-month T-bill rate is 
used to capture interest rate risk (INTRISK). This variable is expected to reveal the interest rate 
cycle movements that influence the deposit-taking and lending activities of banks. Further, the 
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ratio of the book value of fixed assets to total assets is incorporated in our regression model to 
proxy for the ex-ante operating leverage (OPERLEV). Indeed, the impact of operating leverage 
on risk has been found to be analogous to that of the financial leverage, i.e., to play the role of a 
multiplier to both gains and losses. Additionally, two proxies for possible alterations in the 
traditional borrowing and lending activities of banks are included in our model as additional 
control variables. In particular, we proxy banks’ asset composition with the ratio of net loans to 
total assets (ASSETCOMP) so as to account for changes in bank lending activity. In order to 
capture any changes in the traditional funding sources of banks we employ a measure for the 
composition of bank liabilities, which is calculated as the ratio of demand deposits to total 
liabilities (LIABCOMP). It is widely thought that economic performance has a considerable 
effect on the demand and supply of banking services. More precisely, high levels of banking 
activity are generally related to favorable economic conditions. In this context, the 
macroeconomic environment is largely considered to have an impact on the stability of the 
financial sector. We thus employ the GDP output gap (GDP) to control for variations in 
economic growth.  
 
3.3. The model  
To evaluate the relationship of bank soundness with leverage as well as reverse leverage, we 
estimate the following panel data model:  
 
, , ,iq iq k iq k m iq m iqY lev x          i = 1, 2…, N=12;  q=2002q1, 2002q2,…,Q=2010q2 
         k=7 (the total number of leverage variable measures) 
        m=7 (the total number of control variables) 
 
where Yiq stands for the risk variables; the vector leviq,k includes all different measures of leverage 
described above; xiq,m  represents the vector of the bank-specific and macroeconomic control 
variables; εiq is the regression error term, whereas the vectors α, β, γ contain the parameters of 
interest to be estimated.  
     As parameter estimates from OLS will be biased in case regressors are endogenously 
determined along with the dependent variable, we estimate the model by means of two-stage 
least squares (2SLS) instrumental variable regression for the two periods examined. In particular, 
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one- to three-period lags are used as instruments. To further address the issue of possible 
endogeneity we also use fixed effects in the instrumental variables regression. Last but not least, 
we lag some of the control variables to avoid simultaneity. 
 
 
4. Discussion of the results 
The regression results are presented in Tables 1 to 4. More precisely, Tables 1 and 2 report the 
results for the time period preceding the emergence of the current crisis, whereas Tables 3 and 4 
contain the empirical results for the crisis period.  
 
4.1. Pre-crisis period 
A positive and statistically significant effect of LEV1 on total bank risk is reported. Notably, this 
relationship remains positive and significant even if (any of) the alternative leverage measures 
(i.e., LEV2, LEV3) are utilized. Along the same lines, both EMBEDLEV and OBSLEV are found 
to have a significantly positive impact on total bank risk-taking. Overall, these results show that 
banks which are highly levered (either on- or off-balance sheet) exert higher risk to the system. 
As regards leverage of different maturity, SHORTLEV increases TOTRISK while LONGLEV has 
a negative and significant relationship with the dependent variable of the model. In addition, 
market turmoil as reflected in the increased level of interest rate risk (INTRISK) imparts an 
upward pressure to bank total risk, whereas GDP and OPERLEV are negatively linked to 
TOTRISK, a finding which is in line with both theoretical and empirical literature (see, e.g., Uhde 
and Heimeshoff, 2009; Berger et al., 2009).
12  
More interestingly, ASSETCOMP has a significantly negative effect on TOTRISK. This 
implies that those banks that were concentrated on traditional bank lending activities before the 
crisis contributed less to the overall bank risk than those that were entangled with new financial 
instruments.
13
  Evidently, the relationship that holds between the diversification of bank output 
through the production and release of modern financial items with risk could be either negative 
or positive. In the former case, there are at least two channels through which product 
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 We also use the quarterly change in the US inflation rate taken by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics to verify that 
favorable macroeconomic conditions mitigate TOTRISK. 
13
 The banking literature provides ample empirical evidence on the upsurge in the volume of modern activities of US 
banking institutions before the crisis (see, e.g., Rogers and Sinkey, 1999; Stiroh, 2004).  
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diversification leads to a reduction in the overall bank risk-taking. The first is largely related to 
the conventional wisdom among bank scholars and practitioners and shows that non-interest 
(fee) income -which is produced by innovative financial assets- is less sensitive to changes in the 
economic and business environment than interest income -which is produced by traditional 
assets, like bank loans. This is to say that banks which rely more on the former type of income 
are typically exposed to less risk as they manage to reduce the cyclical variations in profits and 
revenue. Turning to the second channel, in case there is a negative or a weak correlation between 
the above two sorts of income, then -according to the traditional banking and portfolio theories 
(see, e.g., Diamond, 1984)- any observed increase in the share of fee-generating activities in the 
overall portfolio of banking items reduces the volatility of total earnings via diversification 
effects; as a result, risk is again reduced.  
Nevertheless, each coin has two sides. In line with our empirical findings, DeYoung and 
Roland (2001) argue that non-interest income is less stable compared to its interest counterpart, 
implying that non-traditional activities increase bank riskiness. This happens due to the 
following three reasons: the nature of bank-customer relationships, input mixes, and lower 
capital requirements for the fee-generating activities. To start with the first cause, traditional 
activities like lending generate relatively stable relationships between banks and their customers 
as switching and information costs for both lenders and borrowers are rather high and hence it is 
not in the interest of either side to walk away. In contrast, the above-mentioned costs are lower in 
the case of modern financial activities and this renders the demand for the latter lines of business 
far from solid and continuous. Accordingly, whereas interest income appears to be rather stable, 
non-interest income is likely to fluctuate more over time. Second, a bank can extend a lending 
relationship only with a burden on its variable cost (i.e., interest expense). However, if the bank 
takes the decision to increase the volume of non-traditional services offered to its customers, it 
will have to hire additional fixed labor inputs and this will lead to an increase in its operating 
leverage. A higher operating leverage, in turn, is expected to amplify revenue volatility into 
higher profit volatility. That is, the involvement in non-traditional activities is again related to a 
higher degree of risk. Finally, the existing banking regulatory environment, as described in Basel 
I and II, allows banks to hold just a small amount of capital against fee-based activities in 
comparison with the amount that they are forced to hold for traditional items and which is much 
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higher. The differences in capital requirements suggest an enhanced financial leverage that is 
related with higher earnings volatility for non-traditional activities.  
 
4.2. Crisis period  
Let us now turn to the analysis of the regression results for the crisis period. We first show that 
on-balance sheet leverage (represented by LEV2) is positively and significantly related to total 
bank risk as exactly was the case before the outbreak of the crisis. This finding is verified when 
we replace LEV2 with LEV3 (but not when LEV1 is used instead). Consistently, the coefficients 
of both OBSLEV and EMBEDLEV that stand for implicit leverage are also positive and 
statistically significant. Interestingly, neither SHORTLEV nor LONGLEV is found to have any 
significant relationship with TOTRISK. In general, the picture we obtain from these results 
remains the same with that before the crisis thus throwing further light to the positive link 
between leverage and bank total risk. 
Moreover, total bank risk increases with the low quality of loans and leases offered as is 
evident from the significantly positive relationship between CREDRISK1 and TOTRISK.
14
 Since 
no similar result is reported in the pre-crisis period, we interpret this last finding as suggesting 
that the low-quality loans and leases offered by TBTF US banks before the onset of the current 
crisis put immense pressure on the soundness of the financial system. Consequently, a serious 
threat to systemic stability is formed by the large number of bad loans that big banks still hold in 
their portfolios. This suggests that large commercial banks need to focus more on credit risk 
management, which has proved to be problematic the years before the crisis. Indeed, 
considerable banking problems have arisen from the failure of banks to recognize impaired 
assets and create reserves for writing off these assets. Regarding INTRISK, it has also a positive 
sign indicating that total bank risk is higher when the variability of short-term bond rates 
becomes higher.  
Further, if we focus on the liabilities side of banks’ balance sheets we could argue that 
traditional banking activities like deposit-taking reduce total bank risk as LIABCOMP is found to 
be negatively linked with TOTRISK. The negative impact of OPERLEV on TOTRISK that we 
also report is in line with the latter finding as well as with the DeYoung and Roland (2001)  view  
                                                          
14
 An overall negative relationship is confirmed by the use of CREDRISK2.  
 15 
(see above) and, in fact, acts as a complement to the negative relationship between 
ASSETCOMP and TOTRISK that has been documented in the years before the crisis.  
 
 
5. Concluding remarks and policy implications 
In this paper, we studied how leverage affects risk in the US commercial banking sector. To this 
aim, we employed a representative panel data set of very large banks that covers both the pre-
crisis and the crisis periods and modeled the relationship between total bank risk and various 
forms of on- and off-balance sheet leverage as well as short- and long-term leverage.  
Our formal evidence indicates reliably that leverage contributes to total bank risk thus 
corroborating the claims towards this end that appear in the relevant literature as well as in the 
popular press. In specific, we lend support to the view that TBTF commercial banks do not 
maintain a level of leverage that could allow equity capital to act as a buffer, absorbing losses 
and enabling the business to continue in case of a financial turmoil. Instead, banks accumulate 
leverage, both on- and off- balance sheet, forcing the system to either fail or consider large-scale 
bailouts. From the investors’ viewpoint, even the most sophisticated ones may tend to 
underestimate the overall level of an institution’s leverage and hence to undervalue risk, as they 
are not capable of properly pricing implicit leverage.  
To continue, the positive relationship that we document between short-term leverage and risk 
shows that leverage is one of the main factors responsible for the severe bank liquidity shortages 
in the pre-crisis era. By largely relying on new financial products before the crisis, banks 
managed to extend the short-term funding of their medium- and long-term assets. This increased 
maturity mismatch raising the probability of bank runs and rendering the financial system more 
fragile. This last finding is verified by the negative link between long-term leverage and bank 
risk for the period before the crisis. In sum, the direct link between leverage and risk provides the 
necessary condition to the current debate on stricter bank regulation through the imposition of 
explicit, non-risk-based leverage ratios as it is the case in Canada for many years now (see 
Bordeleau et al., 2009).  
Lastly, we find quite clearly that those banks that concentrate on traditional banking activities 
typically carry less risk exposure than those that are involved with new financial instruments. On 
the asset side of banks’ balance sheets, the replacement of traditional loans with tranches of 
 16 
Asset Backed Securities (ABS), Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDO) and other associated 
derivatives increases total bank risk regardless of the specific period examined. Although such 
tranches were often AAA-rated and thus of low risk, the newer assets originated by banks were 
down-the-quality-curve.
15
 Turning to the liability side of the balance sheets, the traditional 
business of taking deposits from households, which has been relatively declined compared to the 
non-interest income business, is found to lower total risk. All things considered, the latter 
findings could play a role in the current discussion about a possible revival of the Glass-Steagall 
Act. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
15
 This was often not taken into serious consideration by rating agencies before the crisis. 
 17 
References 
Adrian, T., Shin, H.S., 2010. Liquidity and leverage. Journal of Financial Intermediation 19, 
418-437. 
Berger, A.N., Klapper, L.F., and Turk-Ariss, R., 2009. Bank competition and financial stability. 
Journal of Financial Services Research 35, 99-118. 
Berger, A.N., Bouwman, C.H.S., 2009. Bank liquidity creation. Review of Financial Studies 22, 
3779-3837. 
Beuer, P., 2002. Measuring off-balance sheet leverage. Journal of Banking and Finance 26, 223-
242. 
Bordeleau, E., Crawford, A., and Graham, C., 2009. Regulatory constraints on bank leverage: 
Issues and lessons from the Canadian experience. Bank of Canada Discussion Paper Series 
15.  
Brissimis, S.N., Delis, M.D., and Papanikolaou, N.I., 2008. Exploring the nexus between 
banking sector reform and performance: Evidence from newly acceded EU countries. Journal 
of Banking and Finance 32, 2674-2683. 
DeYoung, R., Roland, K.P., 2001. Product mix and earnings volatility at commercial banks: 
evidence from a degree of total leverage model. Journal of Financial Intermediation 10, 54-
84. 
Diamond, D., 1984. Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring. Review of Economic 
Studies 51, 393-414. 
Galloway, T.M., Winson, B.L., Roden, D.M., 1997. Banks’ changing incentives and 
opportunities for risk taking. Journal of Banking and Finance 21, 509-527. 
Gonzalez, F., 2005. Bank regulation and risk-taking incentives: An international comparison of 
bank risk. Journal of Banking and Finance 29, 1153-1184. 
Huang, X., Zhou, H., Zhu, H., 2009. A framework for assessing the systemic risk of major 
financial institutions. Journal of Banking and Finance 33, 2036-2049. 
Jensen, M., 1986. Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance and takeovers. American 
Economic Review 76, 323-329. 
Jensen, M.C., Meckling, W.H., 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and 
ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305-360. 
 18 
Rime, B., Stiroh, K. J., 2003. The performance of universal banks: evidence from Switzerland. 
Journal of Banking and Finance 27, 2121-2150. 
Rogers, K., Sinkey, J.F.Jr., 1999. An analysis of nontraditional activities at U.S. commercial 
banks. Review of Financial Economics 8, 25-39 
Stiroh, K., 2004. Diversification in banking: Is non-interest income the answer? Journal of 
Money, Credit and Banking 36, 853-882. 
Titman, S., Trueman, B., 1986. Information quality and the valuation of new issues. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics 8, 159-172. 
Uhde, A., Heimeshoff, U., 2009. Consolidation in banking and financial stability in Europe: 
Empirical Evidence. Journal of Banking and Finance 33, 1299-1311. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 19 
Appendix I: Sample of banks  
1. BANK OF AMERICA NA  7. STATE STREET BANK&TRUST CO 
2. JP MORGAN CHASE BANK  8. KEYBANK NATIONAL ASSN 
3. CITIBANK NATIONAL ASSN  9. SUNTRUST BANK  
4. US BANK NA 10. PNC BANK NATIONAL ASSN 
5. WELLS FARGO BANK NA 11. NATIONAL CITY BANK (OH)  
6. BANK OF NEW YORK 12. NORTHERN TRUST & CO 
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Appendix II: Variables  
Variable  Abbreviation Definition Data source 
Total bank risk TOTRISK The quarterly standard deviation of each 
bank’s weekly stock market returns 
Thomson 
Datastream 
On-balance sheet 
leverage 
LEV1 The ratio of total assets to book equity 
capital 
 
FDIC Reports on 
Condition and 
Income 
LEV2 The inverted Tier 1 leverage ratio  
LEV3 The ratio of total liabilities to book 
equity capital 
Embedded 
leverage 
EMBEDLEV  The ratio of notional amounts of 
derivatives outstanding to Tier 1 & 2 
regulatory capital  
OCC Quarterly 
Report on Bank 
Derivatives 
Activities 
Off-balance sheet 
leverage 
OBSLEV The ratio of the nominal value of off-
balance sheet liabilities to book equity 
capital 
FDIC Reports on 
Condition and 
Income 
Short-term 
leverage 
SHORTLEV The ratio of short-term borrowing to 
book equity capital 
FDIC Reports on 
Condition and 
Income 
Long-term 
leverage 
LONGLEV The sum of other borrowings larger 
than one year with mandatory 
convertible securities, subordinated 
notes and debentures divided by 
book equity capital 
FDIC Reports on 
Condition and 
Income 
Credit risk CREDRISK1 Allowance for loan and lease losses 
scaled by total loans 
FDIC Reports on 
Condition and 
Income CREDRISK2 The ratio of non-accrual loan and lease 
finance receivables to total loans 
Interest rate risk INTRISK The quarterly standard deviation of the 
day-to-day 3-month T-bill rate 
Federal Reserve 
Board 
Operating 
leverage 
OPERLEV The ratio of fixed assets to total assets FDIC Reports on 
Condition and 
Income 
Asset 
composition 
ASSETCOMP The ratio of net loans and leases to total 
assets 
FDIC Reports on 
Condition and 
Income 
Liability 
Composition 
LIABCOMP The ratio of demand deposits to total 
liabilities 
FDIC Reports on 
Condition and 
Income 
Macroeconomic 
conditions 
GDP 
 
GDP output gap 
 
Bureau of 
Economic 
Analysis, US 
Department of 
Labor 
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Appendix III: Summary statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Mean Median Max Min Std. Dev. 
 
No of obs 
 
Panel A       
TOTRISK       1.39       1.31         3.59       0.34       0.72 263 
LEV1      11.67      11.74       18.64       9.01       2.13 261 
LEV2       0.11        0.10        0.38       0.02       0.05 262 
LEV3       1.02        0.98         1.20       0.80       0.04 263 
EMBEDLEV   192.08       38.07 28754.91       2.75  1198.96 260 
OBSLEV       0.10         0.01         4.87       0.01       0.49 260 
SHORTLEV       4.88         4.93       12.84       1.44       1.80 256 
LONGLEV       3.71         3.67       11.03       1.12       2.08 259 
CREDRISK1       0.02         0.02        0.04       0.00       0.00 261 
CREDRISK2       0.01         0.01        0.03       0.00       0.00 257 
INTRISK       0.11         0.10         0.21       0.02       0.04 258 
OPERLEV       0.01         0.01          0.03       0.00       0.00 260 
ASSETCOMP       0.57         0.55         0.84       0.05       0.19 258 
LIABCOMP       0.07         0.07         0.20       0.01       0.04 263 
GDP     10.87       10.81       10.12     10.05       0.03 263 
Panel B       
TOTRISK       3.27       3.02     9.78       0.41      1.98 131 
LEV1      12.55     12.51     25.54       3.30      2.86 129 
LEV2       0.12      0.11      0.35       0.01      0.07 129 
LEV3       1.12      1.10      1.78       0.72      0.06 130 
EMBEDLEV 
 
  119.43    34.70  902.01       4.98  170.21 130 
OBSLEV 
 
      0.05      0.05      4.10       0.00      0.32 127 
SHORTLEV       3.25      2.45    13.98       0.18      2.34 129 
LONGLEV       2.26      2.01    11.97       0.12      1.76 128 
CREDRISK1       0.01      0.01      0.04       0.00      0.01 131 
CREDRISK2       0.02      0.02      0.06       0.00      0.01 130 
INTRISK       0.29      0.28      0.73       0.02      0.24 131 
OPERLEV       0.01      0.01      0.03       0.00      0.00 130 
ASSETCOMP       0.58      0.57      0.79       0.05      0.19 127 
LIABCOMP       0.06      0.06      0.27       0.00      0.05 128 
GDP     10.14    10.13     10.15      10.12      0.00 131 
       This Appendix reports the summary statistics for all regression variables used in the empirical 
analysis. Panel A relies on data from 2002q1 to 2007q2. In Panel B we use data over the period 
2007q3-2010q2.  
 22 
Table 1 
     
     Variable Coefficient  t-statistic  
     
     
constant                  3.49***  2.59  
LEV1                  2.54***  4.78  
EMBEDLEV                  1.67**  1.85  
SHORTLEV                  3.89**               1.79  
LONGLEV                 -1.54**  -1.91  
CREDRISK1                  0.78  0.99  
INTRISK                  0.36**  1.69  
OPERLEV                 -1.23***  -4.24  
ASSETCOMP                 -3.54**  -1.84  
LIABCOMP                   0.43  0.56  
GDP                 -6.82***  -4.78  
     
     Regression results for the pre-crisis period (2002q1-2007q2). The dependent variable is total 
bank risk (TOTRISK). As independent variables we include on-balance sheet leverage (LEV1), 
embedded leverage (EMBEDLEV), short-term leverage (SHORTLEV), long-term leverage 
(LONGLEV), credit risk (CREDRISK1), interest rate risk (INTRISK), operating leverage 
(OPERLEV), banks’ asset composition (ASSETCOMP), banks’ liabilities composition 
(LIABCOMP), and the level of economic development (GDP).  
***, **, * correspond to 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance respectively for a two-tailed 
distribution. 
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Table 2 
     
     Variable Coefficient  t-statistic  
     
     
constant                 3.76***  1.85  
LEV2                 2.50***  2.75  
OBSLEV                 2.43**  1.92  
SHORTLEV                 4.11**  1.88  
LONGLEV                -1.56**  -1.78  
CREDRISK2                 0.65  0.64  
INTRISK                 3.65***  2.87  
OPERLEV                 -2.85**  -1.84  
ASSETCOMP                -3.32**  -1.81  
LIABCOMP                -0.23*  -1.45  
GDP               -10.47***  -6.23  
     
     Regression results for the pre-crisis period (2002q1-2007q2). The dependent variable is total 
bank risk (TOTRISK). As independent variables we include on-balance sheet leverage (LEV2), 
off-balance sheet leverage (OBSLEV), short-term leverage (SHORTLEV), long-term leverage 
(LONGLEV), credit risk (CREDRISK2), interest rate risk (INTRISK), operating leverage 
(OPERLEV), banks’ asset composition (ASSETCOMP), banks’ liabilities composition 
(LIABCOMP), and the level of economic development (GDP).  
***, **, * correspond to 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance respectively for a two-tailed 
distribution. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        
 24 
Table 3 
     
     Variable Coefficient  t-statistic  
     
     
constant       10.13*  1.64  
LEV2            5.67***  3.87  
EMBEDLEV          4.76**   1.81  
SHORTLEV                   0.20*  1.73  
LONGLEV      0.17  0.23  
CREDRISK1            5.17***  3.78  
INTRISK            4.76***  2.88  
OPERLEV            -8.98***  -6.90  
ASSETCOMP       -0.03  -0.61  
LIABCOMP            -5.01***  -4.79  
GDP           4.74**  2.98  
     
     Regression results for the crisis period (2007q3-2010q2). The dependent variable is total bank 
risk (TOTRISK). As independent variables we include on-balance sheet leverage (LEV2), 
embedded bank leverage (EMBEDLEV), short-term leverage (SHORTLEV), long-term 
leverage (LONGLEV), credit risk (CREDRISK1), interest rate risk (INTRISK), operating 
leverage (OPERLEV), banks’ asset composition (ASSETCOMP), banks’ liabilities 
composition (LIABCOMP), and the level of economic development (GDP). ***, **, * 
correspond to 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance respectively for a two-tailed 
distribution. 
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Table 4     
     
     Variable Coefficient  t-statistic  
     
     constant        5.98**  1.92  
LEV3          6.11***  4.87  
OBSLEV                   9.85***  4.30  
SHORTLEV    -0.10  -0.70  
LONGLEV     0.75  0.12  
CREDRISK2           7.24***  4.75  
INTRISK           3.78***  2.61  
OPERLEV          -2.32***  -3.97  
ASSETCOMP     -0.14  1.23  
LIABCOMP            -3.63***  -3.87  
GDP            8.31***  3.21  
     
     Regression results for the crisis period (2007q3-2010q2). The dependent variable is total bank 
risk (TOTRISK). As independent variables we include on-balance sheet leverage (LEV3), off-
balance sheet leverage (OBSLEV), short-term leverage (SHORTLEV), long-term leverage 
(LONGLEV), credit risk (CREDRISK2), interest rate risk (INTRISK), operating leverage 
(OPERLEV), banks’ asset composition (ASSETCOMP), banks’ liabilities composition 
(LIABCOMP), and the level of economic development (GDP).  
***, **, * correspond to 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance respectively for a two-tailed 
distribution. 
                              
